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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970679-CA 
v. : 
KAREN M. DURHAM, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A jury convicted defendant of possession of methamphetamine, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (1998); possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) ; and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was a witness's hearsay statement so clearly admissible as a 
statement against penal interest that the trial court plainly 
erred by failing to admit it? 
Because defendant did not raise this argument in the trial 
court, this Court may review it only for plain error. See, e.g., 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 404-405 (Utah 1994), cert, 
denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). However, defendant's failure to 
argue plain error on appeal precludes reaching the merits of 
1 
defendant's claim. State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 
(Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the texts of rules 801, 802 and 804, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with possession of 
methamphetamine, possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, 
and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 1-3). A jury convicted 
defendant on all three counts (R. 83-84). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory one-to-
fifteen year prison term for possession of methamphetamine, and 
to two terms of 180 days in jail for possession of marijuana and 
drug paraphernalia (R. 114). The judge ordered that all terms 
run concurrently and gave defendant credit for the time she had 
already served (id.). 
Defendant timely filed her notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 2:00 a.m. on August 26, 1996, Jacob Inches went to the 
"hot pots" in Ogden Canyon (R. 247). After he parked, he saw a 
1990 Taurus pull up and park (R. 249-50, 280). No one got out of 
the Taurus (R. 250). Mr. Inches walked past the Taurus on his 
way to the trail leading to the hot pots and noticed two people 
sitting in the car (id.). 
LThe State also charged defendant's boyfriend, Donald 
Bostwick. Mr. Bostwick has appealed separately in case number 
970610-CA. 
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Mr. Inches became suspicious because it was unusual for 
people to stay in their cars rather than to go down to the hot 
pots, and because the Taurus windows remained rolled up even 
though it was a hot August night (id.). Mr. Inches became 
concerned about his car because he knew of prior incidents of 
vandalism, so he returned to his car (R. 250-51). When he 
observed that the Taurus had a different license plate on the 
back than on the front, he called the police (R. 251-52). 
Sergeant Art Haney was dispatched to respond to the call (R. 
274). When he approached the driver's side of the Taurus, he 
found defendant's boyfriend, Donald Bostwick, in the driver's 
seat and defendant in the passenger's (R. 276-77, 342). 
Defendant appeared familiar to Sergeant Haney, and after 
defendant identified herself, Sergeant Haney remembered that he 
had arrested her at her home in 1989 for possession of 
methamphetamine (R. 312). 
When Sergeant Haney asked who owned the Taurus, Mr. Bostwick 
responded that it belonged to a friend who had gone down to the 
hot pots (R. 278). However, neither defendant nor Mr. Bostwick 
could tell Sergeant Haney the friend's name (R. 278). During the 
time he spent there, Sergeant Haney never saw the "friend" (R. 
278) . 
Sergeant Haney checked the license plates on the 1990 
Taurus: the rear plate was registered to a 1977 Ford LTD, and the 
front plate was not on file (R. 279-80). Sergeant Haney then 
took the Taurus's identification number from the plate under the 
3 
windshield and checked it (R. 280). The Taurus had been reported 
stolen one month before (R. 280, 341) . 
At that point, Sergeant Haney asked Mr. Bostwick to get out 
of the car (R. 280-81). He then went around to the passenger 
side and asked defendant to get out (R. 281) . 
As defendant got out, Sergeant Haney saw a brass pipe and a 
baggie, both containing marijuana, on the passenger side floor 
where defendant's feet had been (R. 282-83, 392-93). He told his 
backup officer to watch defendant and Mr. Bostwick and began to 
search the stolen Taurus (R. 282). 
Sergeant Haney found a plastic bottle between the front 
seats where defendant and Mr. Bostwick had been sitting that 
contained methamphetamine rocks and several bindles with 
methamphetamine powder in them (R. 285, 386). Next, he found a 
black TASCO case between the front seats that contained six one-
half cubic centimeter syringes, two empty plastic baggies, a nail 
file, and a Q-tip (R. 286). One of the syringes contained liquid 
methamphetamine, and the plastic bag contained methamphetamine 
residue (R. 286-87, 395-96). 
Sergeant Haney turned his attention to two bags, one purple 
and one brown, in the back seat. He asked who owned the bags (R. 
288). Mr. Bostwick first told him that defendant owned the 
purple bag (id.). However, Mr. Bostwick later claimed that both 
he and defendant had all of their belonging in the brown bag, and 
that neither of them owned the purple bag (id.). 
Sergeant Haney first searched the purple bag (id.). Inside, 
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he found defendant's address book, women's clothing, makeup, a 
propane torch, and a pair of TASCO binoculars (R. 289, 306). He 
also found a black leather case that contained an empty one-half 
cubic centimeter syringe (R. 288-89) . 
Sergeant Haney next searched the brown bag (the bag that Mr. 
Bostwick admitted owning and asserted contained both his and 
defendant's property) (R. 289). Sergeant Haney found men's 
clothing in that bag (R. 2 90). He also found a Harmon's pharmacy 
bag containing two spoons with powder residue on them, six one-
half cubic centimeter syringes, and a small candle (R. 289-90) .2 
The backup officer searched defendant's purse (R. 292). 
That search yielded several plastic baggies with methamphetamine 
residue, a glass pipe with methamphetamine residue, and a water-
filled vial (292, 345, 354, 361, 388-89) . 
While Sergeant Haney searched the Taurus, defendant and Mr. 
Bostwick had moved next to each other and looked like they were 
passing something between them "through their shirts" (R. 2 93, 
342). As Sergeant Haney started to approach them, Mr. Bostwick 
broke and ran at full speed twenty to thirty feet to the river 
(R. 293, 342, 507). Sergeant Haney chased Mr. Bostwick, and, 
about the time Sergeant Haney caught up to him, Mr. Bostwick 
threw a "round bundle" or a "large baggie" into the river (R. 
293, 342) . 
2Sergeant Haney testified that methamphetamine users use 
candles and propane torches to heat the powder and water to make 
liquid methamphetamine, and use spoons to heat the 
methamphetamine (R. 309). 
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Mr. Bostwick refused to tell Sergeant Haney what he had 
thrown (id.). However, when Sergeant Haney pursued the issue, 
Mr. Bostwick claimed that it was a soiled menstrual pad that 
defendant was embarrassed about (R. 2 93-94). 
Sergeant Haney looked along the river bank, but never 
recovered the item (R. 294). During that search, he also shined 
his flashlight over by the hot pots, but saw no one there (R. 
328) . 
The officers arrested defendant and Mr. Bostwick and 
transported them to jail (R. 294-95). 
At trial, defendant called Paul Van Dyke, a man she later 
claimed that she knew only as "Dozer" and identified as the 
"friend" who had purportedly driven her and Mr. Bostwick to the 
hot pots in the stolen Taurus (R. 432, 453-56) . When defense 
counsel asked Mr. Van Dyke if he knew defendant and Mr. Bostwick, 
he responded by exercising his right against self-incrimination 
(R. 433). When asked if he remembered defense counsel meeting 
with him in jail, he again invoked his Fifth Amendment rights (R. 
435) . 
Defense counsel next asked Mr. Van Dyke if he remembered 
signing a statement; the State objected before counsel completed 
the question (R. 436). However, Mr. Van Dyke stated that he 
remembered signing the statement (R. 436). An unrecorded bench 
conference followed (id.). 
After the bench conference, Mr. Van Dyke began answering 
some questions: he admitted seeing defense counsel in jail a few 
6 
months prior to trial; admitted that he considered defendant and 
Mr. Bostwick his friends at that time; and testified that his 
perception of them had changed (R. 436-37). 
Defense counsel again asked Mr. Van Dyke if he had signed a 
statement of guilt, the State objected, and the court called an 
in-chambers conference (R. 437-38). 
During that conference, defense counsel showed the court a 
statement that he claimed Mr. Van Dyke had signed (R. 43 9) .3 
However, the record contains no copy of the statement, and 
defense counsel gave no detailed proffer about the statement's 
contents. 
The State objected that the statement constituted 
inadmissible hearsay, and that defendant could use it only to 
impeach inconsistent testimony (R. 439-40) . The State further 
argued that defendant could not "impeach" Mr. Van Dyke's 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights (R. 440). Defense 
counsel never contradicted this analysis and never argued that 
the statement could come in under the statement-against-penal-
interest hearsay exception, as he now claims on appeal. 
The trial court agreed that defense counsel could use the 
statement only to rebut inconsistent testimony (R. 440-44). The 
trial court also ruled that counsel could question Mr. Van Dyke 
directly about his involvement in this case, and could treat Mr. 
Van Dyke as a hostile witness (R. 444-46) . 
3Nothing in this record establishes whether the statement 
was sworn. 
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In open court following the conference, Mr. Van Dyke 
admitted that he was with defendant and Mr. Bostwick the night of 
the arrest, that he was with them at their home, and that all 
three of them went somewhere in a car (R. 448). However, he 
again invoked his right against self-incrimination when asked the 
kind of car and who drove (R. 449). Defense counsel asked no 
further questions. Transcript pages 432-450 are attached as 
addendum B. 
The argument section contains additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court should 
have admitted Mr. Van Dyke's statement under the statement-
against-penal-interest hearsay exception. However, defendant did 
not preserve that argument in the trial court and has not argued 
plain error on appeal. Those failures independently preclude 
appellate review of his claim. 
Alternatively, defendant cannot establish plain error on 
this record. Defendant did not include a copy of the statement 
in the record and made no detailed proffer about its contents. 
The record establishes that the hearsay statement contains Mr. 
Van Dyke's admission that he drove the Taurus. Although 
defendant asserts in his brief that the statement also contains 
an admission the Mr. Van Dyke owned the seized drugs, he provides 
no supporting record cite and the record is ambiguous on this 
point. 
Moreover, this record fails to establish that defendant 
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could satisfy at least three of the prerequisites for admitting 
the hearsay statement as a statement against penal interest; the 
failure to satisfy any one would have precluded admitting the 
hearsay statement. First, even if Mr. Van Dyke asserted in the 
out-of-court statement that he owned the drugs, defendant has not; 
established that he was unavailable to testify to that. 
Defendant never asked Mr. Van Dyke who owned the drugs; 
consequently, Mr. Van Dyke never refused to answer the question. 
Second, the record does not establish that the hearsay 
statement clearly exculpated defendant. The State charged her 
with possession. Even if Mr. Van Dyke asserted that he drove the 
car and even if he asserted that he owned the drugs, those 
assertions would not have precluded finding that defendant also 
possessed them. Moreover, police found the drugs and 
paraphernalia in her purse, in containers that most likely 
belonged to her and Mr. Bostwick, and around the passenger area 
where they found her sitting. 
Third, the record contains no evidence of corroborating 
circumstances to clearly establish the hearsay statement's 
trustworthiness. 
Finally, defendant has not argued and cannot establish on 
this record how excluding the statement undermines confidence in 
the outcome of the case. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED NO REVERSIBLE ERROR BY THE 
TRIAL COURT FOR FAILING TO ADMIT MR. VAN DYKE'S OUT-OF-
COURT WRITTEN STATEMENT AS A STATEMENT AGAINST PENAL 
INTEREST BECAUSE SHE DID NOT MAKE THAT ARGUMENT BELOW, 
HAS NOT ARGUED PLAIN ERROR ON APPEAL, AND CANNOT 
ESTABLISH PLAIN ERROR ON THIS RECORD 
Among other exceptions to the general proscription against 
admitting hearsay statements, rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
permits admission of an unavailable witness1s hearsay statement 
as substantive evidence as follows: 
A statement which was at the time of its making so far 
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary 
interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to 
civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a 
claim by the declarant against another, that a 
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not 
have made the statement unless believing it to be true. 
A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3). For the first time on appeal, defendant 
argues that the trial court should have admitted Mr. Van Dyke's 
written out-of-court statement under this exception. Appellant's 
Brief at 8-11. 
A. Waiver and failure to argue plain error on appeal. 
In order to preserve this claim for appeal, defendant had to 
present it to the trial court to allow that court the first 
opportunity to correct any error. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 
1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). Defendant never argued to the trial 
court the it should admit Mr. Van Dyke's written statement under 
rule 804(b)(3). 
Consistent with rule 801(d)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
10 
State argued that the hearsay statement could only come in to 
impeach Mr. Van Dyke if he testified inconsistently with it, and 
the trial court accepted that analysis (R. 439-40) . Defendant 
never suggested an alternative basis for admitting the statement 
or that any flaw existed in the State's and the court's treatment 
of the issue. To the contrary, defendant merely responded that, 
given Mr. Van Dyke's refusal to cooperate, it was time to "cut 
him loose" and move on to defendant's and Mr. Bostwick's 
testimony (R. 442). In effect, trial counsel conceded that, 
under rule 801, the defense could use the hearsay statement only 
to impeach inconsistent testimony. Because defendant did not 
argue that the court should admit the statement as a statement 
against interest under rule 804(b)(3), she deprived the trial 
court of the first opportunity to address the claim and therefore 
failed to preserve it for appeal. See, e.a., State v. Beltran-
)Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App. 1996) (where defendant objected 
only on Fifth Amendment grounds to the victim witness remaining 
in the courtroom, he could not add Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims on appeal); State v. Ranael, 866 P.2d 607, 611-12 (Utah 
App. 1993) (references to an evidentiary rule and general 
references to due process concerns were insufficient to preserve 
a facial constitutional challenge to the rule). 
Defendant could nevertheless prevail on this argument if she 
could establish that the trial court plainly erred by not 
admitting the statement under the statement-against-penal-
interest hearsay exception. See, e.g.. State v. Sepulveda, 842 
11 
P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992). However, defendant does not 
argue that the trial court plainly erred, instead treating the 
issue as though she preserved it. Appellant's Brief at 2. Her 
failure to argue plain error precludes treating the merits of 
defendant's claim. Id. at 917-18. 
B. Alternatively, defendant has not and cannot establish 
plain error on this record. 
Even if this Court considers defendant's claim under a plain 
error analysis, the claim fails. In order to admit a hearsay 
statement as a statement against penal interest, the proponent 
must establish that: 1) the declarant was unavailable to testify; 
2) the statement so strongly tended to subject the declarant to 
criminal liability that a reasonable person would not have made 
it unless it was true; 3) the statement inculpated the declarant; 
4) the statement exculpated the proponent; and 5) corroborating 
circumstances "clearly" indicate the statement's trustworthiness. 
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3). See also United States v. Spring, 80 
F.3d 1450, 1461 (10th Cir.) (identically worded federal rule 
804(b)(3) permits admission of hearsay only if the declarant is 
unavailable, the statement is against penal interest, and there 
is sufficient corroboration of its trustworthiness), cert. 
denied,117 S. Ct. 385 (1996).4 Because defendant did not raise 
this argument below, she must establish that Mr. Van Dyke's 
statement so clearly met these criteria that the trial court 
defendant cites no Utah cases interpreting Utah's rule 
804(b)(3), and the State found none. Therefore, the State has 
relied on cases interpreting the identical federal rule. 
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$hould have admitted the statement under this rule on its own. 
See, e.g., State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 404-405 (Utah 1994), 
pert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). On this record, defendant 
can show no plain error. 
The record does not establish what Mr. Van Dyke's written 
hearsay statement says. Defendant failed to include a copy of it 
in the record and failed even to provide a detailed proffer about 
what the written statement contained. See, e.g.. State v. Davis, 
slip op. 960271-CA at 18 (Utah App. August 6, 1998) (parties bear 
the responsibility of compiling a record that will support their 
appellate claims). 
At best, the record establishes that Mr. Van Dyke admitted 
in the written statement that he drove the stolen Taurus the 
night police arrested defendant and Mr. Bostwick. During the in-
chambers conference about the statement, the trial court 
commented that defendant could not offer the written statement 
for the truth that Mr. Van Dyke drove the car that night (R. 
441) . 
The trial court also later referred to Mr. Van Dyke owning 
the drugs. During the conference, the trial court referred to 
defendant "getting into the area" of whether Van Dyke drove the 
car and if the drugs belonged to him (R. 443). However, the 
record does not establish whether the trial court referred to a 
direct admission of ownership in the written statement or only 
whether the trial court meant that defendant would try to show 
that Van Dyke owned the drugs found in the car because he was 
13 
driving it.5 
Even considering what little the record establishes or hints 
about the contents of Mr. Van Dyke's written statement, the 
record contains so many deficiencies in the prerequisites to 
admitting the out-of-court statement as a statement against penal 
interest that the trial court committed no obvious error by 
excluding it. First, even if Mr. Van Dyke claimed in the written 
statement that he owned the drugs, defendant has not established 
the Mr. Van Dyke was "unavailable" to testify to that. 
Admittedly, if a witness refuses to testify by invoking their 
privilege against self-incrimination, the witness becomes 
"unavailable" within the rule's meaning. Utah R. Evid. 
804(a) (1) . 
However, Mr. Van Dyke answered some of the questions posed: 
he admitted that he was with defendant and Mr. Bostwick on the 
night of their arrest, that he was with them at their home, that 
all three of them went somewhere in a car, and that he had signed 
a statement sometime prior to trial (R. 436, 448). He invoked 
his right against self-incrimination when asked what kind of car 
and who drove (R. 449). However, defense counsel never asked Mr. 
Van Dyke whether he owned the drugs that police found in the 
Taurus, and Mr. Van Dyke never invoked the privilege as to that 
issue. Therefore, defendant has not shown that Mr. Van Dyke was 
5In her brief, defendant asserts that Mr. Van Dyke admitted 
in the written statement that he owned the drugs found in the 
car. Appellant's Brief at 7. However, defendant provides no 
record citation to support this contention. That failure 
violates rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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"unavailable" to testify about whether he owned the drugs. 
Second, in light of the evidence, the statement did not so 
Clearly exculpate defendant that the trial court should have 
admitted it sua sponte. As framed by defendant, the only issue 
presented to the jury was whether she knowingly possessed the 
drugs (R. 535, 539-40) . The State could establish that defendant 
knowingly possessed the drugs either by proving that she had 
actual physical possession of them, or by proving that a 
sufficient nexus existed between defendant and the drugs for the 
jury to infer that defendant had both the power and intent to 
exercise dominion and control over them. See, e.g.. State v. 
£ox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
In open view, Sergeant Haney found a brass pipe with 
tnarijuana in the bowel and a baggie containing marijuana residue 
on the floor boards where defendant's feet had been (R. 282-83, 
3 92-93) . Between the front seats where defendant and Mr. 
Bostwick had been sitting, he found a plastic bottle that 
bontained methamphetamine rocks and several bindles with 
methamphetamine powder in them (R. 285, 386). He next found a 
black TASCO case that contained six one-half cubic centimeter 
(syringes, one of which contained liquid methamphetamine (R. 285-
87, 3 95-96) . He later searched a purple bag that Mr. Bostwick 
had initially identified as defendant's that contained 
defendant's address book as well as a pair of TASCO binoculars, a 
propane torch, and a one-half cubic centimeter syringe (R. 288-
89, 3 06). In a brown bag that Mr. Bostwick admitted contained 
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both his and defendant's belongings, Sergeant Haney found two 
spoons with powder residue, six more syringes, and a small candle 
(R. 289-90). Finally, the backup officer found in defendant's 
purse a glass pipe with methamphetamine residue, baggies with 
methamphetamine residue, and a water-filled vial (R. 292, 345, 
354, 361). Sergeant Haney explained how methamphetamine users 
use the spoons, torch, candle, water, and syringes to prepare and 
ingest the drug (R. 308-309) . This evidence established a 
sufficient nexus between defendant and the drugs for the jury to 
infer that she exercised control over them. See State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987) (evidence sufficient to support 
conviction for possession where drugs found under the defendant's 
clothes by defendant's bed in a locked box to which defendant had 
a key, defendant falsely denied having the key, and drug scales 
were found on his bookshelf). Compare State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 
1386, 1389 (Utah App. 1991) (evidence insufficient where drugs 
found in car's back seat and Salas sat in front, another 
passenger had better access to place where police found the 
drugs, Salas was not the exclusive owner or occupier of the car, 
Salas denied having cocaine, and Salas did not have the cocaine 
on his person). Mr. Van Dyke's out-of-court statement that he 
drove the car that night would not rebut that inference; 
therefore, the statement did not so clearly exculpate defendant 
that the trial court should have admitted it sua sponte as a 
statement-against-penal-interest. 
Similarly, even if the written statement contained an 
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assertion that Mr. Van Dyke "owned" the drugs, that assertion 
would not have clearly rebutted the inference that defendant alsc 
exercised sufficient dominion and control over them. The 
officers found some of the drugs and residue on defendant's 
person, some of it in places over which she apparently had 
control, and some of it where officers found her sitting in the 
car. The officers also found most of the equipment (syringes, 
water, glass pipes, spoons, and baggies) for storing, preparing, 
and ingesting the drugs in her bags. Indeed, they found a 
methamphetamine-filled syringe in a TASCO case and TASCO 
binoculars in a bag with defendant's address book. Even the 
drugs found outside of the bags were found in or near the 
passenger area of the car where officers found defendant sitting. 
On these facts, Mr. Van Dyke's ownership would not have negated 
defendant's knowing possession. 
Finally, the record contains no evidence of corroborating 
circumstances clearly establishing the statement's 
trustworthiness. The State found no Utah cases articulating the 
appropriate analysis under this element. Generally, the federal 
cases consider both the reliability of the statement based on the 
circumstances under which the declarant gave it; and whether the 
record contains independent evidence to support the statement's 
truthfulness. See, e.g., United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 
1461 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 385 (1996); United 
States v. Bumpass, 60 F.3d 1099, 1102-1104 (4th Cir. 1995), cert, 
denied, 516 U.S. 1119 (1996); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 
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833, 836-37 (3rd Cir. 1988); United States v. Salvador, 820 F.2d 
558, 561-62 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 966 (1987).6 
Defendant has not argued that corroborating circumstances 
clearly establish the trustworthiness of Mr. Van Dyke's out-of-
court statement, and this record precludes reaching that 
conclusion. First, the out-of-court admission that he drove the 
car contradicts the rest of the evidence in this case, other than 
defendant's and Mr. Bostwick's self-serving testimony. Mr. 
Inches, a disinterested observer, testified that he saw the car 
pull up, and that no one got out (R. 250). Officers found only 
defendant and Mr. Bostwick in the car (R. 276-78, 340-42) . 
During the time they were at the scene, the unnamed "friend" 
never appeared (R. 278) 
Defendant testified that the three of them rode to the hot 
pots together and that she sat between Mr. Van Dyke, who drove, 
and Mr. Bostwick, who sat in the passenger seat (R. 470). She 
further testified that neither she nor Mr. Bostwick ever got out 
of the car (R. 472). However, when officers arrived, they 
discovered defendant in the passenger seat, and Mr. Bostwick in 
the driver's seat (R. 276-78, 340-42) .7 
6However, in United States v. Rasmussen, 790 F.2d 55 (8th 
Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit considered only the circumstances 
under which the declarant gave the statement. Id. at 56-57. By 
contrast, in United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 
1985), the Tenth Circuit looked only to whether the record 
contained evidence corroborating the statement's truthfulness. 
For the reasons argued in the body of the brief, however, 
defendant has not argued, let alone established either. 
7Defendant tried to explain this by testifying that Mr. 
Bostwick changed his clothes in the car, and that, during that 
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Similarly, even if Mr. Van Dyke asserted that he owned the 
drugs, the evidence does not corroborate that assertion. As 
detailed above, police found many of the drugs and paraphernalia 
in bags that clearly belonged to defendant and Mr. Bostwick (R. 
286-90, 292, 306, 345, 354, 364, 388-90, 395-96). They also 
found syringes, including one loaded with liquid methamphetamine, 
in a TASCO case; later, they found TASCO binoculars in a bag that 
also contained defendant's address book (R. 286-87, 289, 306, 
395-96). They also found a syringe in the purple bag (R. 288-
I 
89). The remainder of the drugs and paraphernalia they found 
either at defendant's feet or between where defendant and Mr. 
Bostwick had been sitting (R. 282-83, 285-86, 392-93, 395-96). 
They never found Mr. Van Dyke anywhere near any of the drugs.8 
Compare United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d at 554 (evidence 
corroborated declarant's statements that Lopez knew nothing of 
drugs hidden in the car Lopez was driving where declarant's, but 
not Lopez's fingerprints were found on the drug packages). 
Moreover, the record provides almost no information about 
the circumstances under which Mr. Van Dyke purportedly signed the 
out-of-court statement. Trial counsel proffered only that Mr. 
process, she and Mr. Bostwick switched positions (R. 472). 
defendant's and Mr. Bostwick's testimony provided the only 
evidence that Mr. Van Dyke may have been near the drugs. 
However, his proximity as the alleged driver does not explain why 
so many of the drugs and paraphernalia were found in bags that 
belonged to defendant and Mr. Bostwick. Moreover, defendant 
never testified that the drugs and paraphernalia belonged to Mr. 
Van Dyke, only that she had no knowledge that the car contained 
any drugs or paraphernalia (R. 460-61, 484). 
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Van Dyke signed it in counsel's and a police officer's presence, 
and the record establishes that the State had not charged Mr. Van 
Dyke with what he allegedly admitted to in the statement (R. 43 9, 
441). Indeed, the record does not even establish whether the 
statement was sworn. 
Mr. Van Dyke testified that, at one time, he had considered 
defendant and Mr. Bostwick his friends (R. 436-37). He may have 
decided to take responsibility for the crime to help them out. 
See United States v. Bumpass. 60 F.3d at 1103 (statement not 
sufficiently corroborated because declarant was Bumpass's friend 
and Bumpass had a more extensive criminal history). 
Moreover, when questioning resumed after the chambers 
conference, Mr. Van Dyke asked the trial court whether his 
"immunity agreement" in another case would apply to his testimony 
in this case (R. 447-48).9 This reference suggests that Mr. Van 
Dyke may have previously agreed to take responsibility for the 
crime, not because he in fact committed it, but because he 
believed that the State could not prosecute him for it. 
Consequently, what little evidence the record does contain about 
the circumstances under which Van Dyke signed the statement does 
not clearly establish its reliability. 
In short, the record fails to establish obvious error on at 
least three of the prerequisites to the admission of Mr. Van 
Dyke's hearsay statement as a statement against penal interest. 
9The trial court, of course, refused to give him legal 
advice about scope of that agreement (id.). 
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The failure to establish any one would have precluded admitting 
the statement as one against Mr. Van Dyke's penal interest. 
Therefore, this record precludes finding that it should have been 
obvious to the trial court that the hearsay statement was an 
admissible statement against penal interest. 
Finally, defendant has not argued how exclusion of the 
evidence undermines confidence in the outcome. Given the 
locations where the officers found the drugs, an admission that 
Mr. Van Dyke drove the car, and even one that he owned the drugs, 
would not likely have persuaded the jury that defendant did not 
knowingly possessed them. In addition, defendant admitted that 
she had used methamphetamine in the past, that she typically 
injected it, and that she had a prior conviction for using 
methamphetamines. Officers found a syringe in her purple bag; 
syringes, including one loaded with methamphetamine, in a TASCO 
bag that most likely belonged to her; a syringe in the purple bag 
that also contained women's clothing and defendant's address 
book; and six syringes in the bag that her boyfriend admitted 
contained both their belongings (R. 285, 288-90, 306, 386) .10 
Finally, defendant and Mr. Bostwick did not behave like the 
innocent occupiers of a car that contained someone else's drugs. 
The backup officer saw defendant pass something out of her shirt 
to Mr. Bostwick (R. 342). Mr. Bostwick then ran at full speed to 
the river's edge and threw it in (R. 342, 507). He first refused 
10Although at trial defendant could not state which of the 
bags contained their belongings, she agreed that her belongings 
were with defendant's (R. 474). 
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to tell Sergeant Haney what it was, then explained that he had 
only disposed of defendant's soiled menstrual pad (R. 293-94).n 
In light of the totality of the evidence, exclusion of the 
out-of-court statement does not undermine confidence in the 
outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the Court should affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7 day of /£ 
/??S . ^ 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney Genera] 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
nIn addition to the other problems with this explanation, 
it was not credible because the backup officer saw the defendant 
pass something out of her shirt, not her shorts; and because 
defendant was fifty-seven years old at the time (R. 342, 474) . 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
655 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 801 
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may 
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert 
witness. 
(d) Parties'experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in 
calling expert witnesses of their own selection. 
(;^nended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is inherent authority to call a witness. Merchants 
the federal rule, verbatim. Rules 59-61 of the Bank v. Goodfeilow, 44 Utah 349, 140 P. 759 
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953), on which the '(1914). 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) were patterned, Cross References, — Blood tests in actions 
provided for the appointment, compensation to determine parentage, appointment of ex-
and handling of appointed expert witness tea-
 p er ts by court, §§ 78-25-18 et seq., 78-45a-7 to 
timony. These rules were not adopted in the 78«45a-10. 
state of Utah. The reason for the rejection is Criminal proceedings, court appointment of 
unknown. However, the Utah Supreme Court
 rt w i t n e s a e a U.R.Crim.P. 15. 
has previously indicated that a trial judge has 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Testimony at trial. but this is not mandatory. Merriam v. Merriam, 
Subdivision (a) provides that a court-ap- 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
pointed expert may be called as a trial witness, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Right of independent expert to Right of indigent defendant in state criminal 
refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50 case to assistance of chemist, toxicoiogist, tech-
A.L.R.4th 680. nician, narcotics expert, or similar nonmedical 
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal specialist in substance analysis, 74 A.L.R.4th 
case to assistance of expert in social attitudes, 388. 
74 A.L.R.4th 330. 
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the state-
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption 
or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's 
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
Rule 8 0 1 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 656 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection 
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). 
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay 
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices 
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of 
"hearsay* in subdivision (c) is substantially the 
same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). 
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from 
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior 
statements as substantive evidence if (1) incon-
sistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and 
does not require the prior statement to have 
been given under oath or subject to perjury. The 
former Utah rules admitted such statements as 
an exception to the hearsay rule. See California 
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with respect to 
confrontation problems under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally promulgated 
by the United States Supreme Court with the 
addition of the language "or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten" 
and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and 
the actual effect on most juries. 
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) is in substance the 
same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its 
interpretation of the applicable rule in this 
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,310 
P.2d 388 (1957). 
Subdivision (d)(1)(C) comports with prior 
Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123, 
388 R2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 
2d 277, 451 P.2d 786 (1969). 
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was 
contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
Administrative proceedings. 
Admissions by party-opponent. 
—Adoptive admissions. 
—Coconspirator's statements. 
—Party's own statements. 
Corporations. 
Criminal defendant. 
——Owner. 
State. 
Basis of conviction. 
Hearsay. 
Prior statement by witness. 
—Consistent with testimony. 
—Inconsistent with testimony. 
Cited. 
Administrative proceedings* 
Relying on a vocational evaluation, which 
concluded that the plaintiff worker seeking 
permanent total disability benefits could be 
l Similar provisions to subdivisions (dX2)(B) 
and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
f Rule 63(9), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), 
* was of similar substance and scope to subdivi-
f sion (d)(2)(D), except that Rule 63(9) required 
5
 that the declarant be unavailable before such 
* admissions are received. Adoptive and vicari-
ous admissions have been recognized as admis-
* sible in criminal as well as civil cases. State v. 
J Kerekes, 622 P2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
r
 Statements by a coconspirator of a party 
[ made during the course and in furtherance of 
1
 the conspiracy, admissible as non-hearsay un-
| der subdivision (d)(2)(E), have traditionally 
' been admitted as exceptions to the hearsay 
1
 rule. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,120 P2d 285 
| (1941). Rule 63(9)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), was broader than this rule in that it 
provided for the admission of statements made 
j while the party and declarant were participat-
i ing in a plan to commit a crime or a civil wrong 
J if the statement was relevant to the plan or its 
» subject matter and made while the plan was in 
[ existence and before its complete execution or 
other termination. 
> Cross References. — Affidavits admissible 
I in hearing on motion, U.R.C.P. 43(b). 
; Affidavits, taking and certification of, § 78-
t 26-5 et seq. 
\ Contemporaneous entries and writings of de-
cedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8. 
Depositions and discovery, U.R.C.P. 26 et seq. 
Judgment, entry of, U.R.C.P. 58A. 
Judgment roil in criminal case, contents and 
filing, U.R.Crim.P. 22. 
i Marriage certificate, issuance and filing, 
: §§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12. 
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3; 
U.R.C.P. 44. 
rehabilitated, the Industrial Commission over-
turned an administrative law judge's decision 
granting benefits; however, the report relied on 
by the Commission, although admissible in the 
Commissions proceedings, was hearsay, and 
without other non-hearsay, legally admissible 
evidence to support rehabilitation, the Com-
mission erred. Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n, 
918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 
925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
Admissions by party-opponent, 
—Adoptive admissions. 
Where defendant was present at time third 
party used term *we* in describing who was 
making threat but made no attempt to contra-
dict use of "we," witness' testimony as to third 
party's threat was admissible under the adop-
tive admissions exception to the hearsay rule. 
State v.Carisen, 638 P.2d512 (Utah iQftii r»rt 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983 — Part III, 1995 Utah L. Rev 683. 
grigham-Young Law Review. — The Hob-
goblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence: An 
Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent 
statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 231. 
Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in 
the Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their 
Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp.'L. 
31 (1989). 
V^ni. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 493 et seq. 
CJ.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 259 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of impeached wit-
ness' prior consistent statement—modern state 
criminal cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1014. 
Admissibility of tape recording or transcript 
of "911* emergency telephone call, 3 A.L.R.5th 
784. 
Admissibility in evidence of composite pic-
ture or sketch produced by police to identify 
offender, 23 A.L.R.5th 672. 
Admissibility as anot hearsay" of statement 
by party's attorney under Federal Rules of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) or 801(d)(2)(D), 117 
A.L.R. Fed. 599. 
Interpreter or translator as party's agent for 
purposes of "admission by party-opponent" ex-
ception to hearsay rule (Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 801 (d)(2)(D)), 121 A.L.R. Fed. 611. 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
11974), and is the same as the first paragraph of 
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Cross References. — Affidavits, taking and 
certification of, § 78-26-5 et seq. 
Contemporaneous entries and writings of de-
cedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8. 
Judgment, entry of, U.R.C.R 58A. 
Judgment roll in criminal case, contents and 
filing, U.R. Crim. P. 22. 
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing, 
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12. 
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3; 
U.R.C.R 44. 
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
In general. 
Chemical breath analysis. 
Purpose. 
In general. 
Hearsay is generally not admissible on the 
ground that it lacks trustworthiness for two 
basic reasons: (1) the person who purports to 
know the facts is not stating them under oath; 
<2) that person is not present for cross-exami-
nation. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 
388(1957). 
Chemical breath analysis . 
Section 41-6-44.3, governing the admission of 
chemical breath analysis, is a valid statutory 
exception to the hearsay rule. Layton City v. 
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988). 
Purpose. 
The hearsay rule has as its declared purpose 
the exclusion of evidence not subject to cross-
examination concerning the truthfulness of the 
matters asserted. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in 
the Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their 
Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 
81 (1989). 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or 
immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition. 
667 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 804 
Admissibility of newspaper article as evi- matter as to physical or documentary evidence 
dence of the truth of the facts stated therein, 55 or the like — modern cases, 27 A.L.R.4th 105. 
A.L.R.3d 663. Admissibility of visual recording of event or 
Admissibility in evidence of sound recording matter giving rise to litigation or prosecution, 
as affected by hearsay and best evidence rules, 41 A.L.R.4th 812. 
58 A.L.R.3d 598. Uniform Evidence Rule 803(24): the residual 
Letters to or from customers or suppliers as hearsay exception, 51 A.L.R.4th 999. 
business records under statutes authorizing Admissibility of school records under hearsay 
r l e K l 0 6 9 U S m e S S S m e V l d e n C e ' 6 8 exceptions, 57 A.L.R.4th 1111. 
A
 Admissibility under business entry statutes , Admissibility of evidence of reputation as to 
of hospital records in criminal cases, 69 ^ H ^ 
A L R 3d 22 (*er ^u*e 803(20) of Uniform Rules of Evidence 
Admissibility under Uniform Business and similar formulations, 79 A.L.R.4th 1044. 
Records as Evidence Act or similar statute of Admissibility of testimony of expert, as to 
medical report made by consulting physician to basis of his opinion, to matters otherwise ex-
treating physician, 69 A.L.R.3d 104. cludible as hearsay — state cases, 89 A.L.R.4th 
Admissibility, as res gestae, of accusatory 456. 
utterances made by homicide victim before the Admissibility of government factfinding in 
act, 74 A.L.R.3d 963. products liability actions, 29 A.L.R.5th 534. 
Admissibility of computerized private busi- Exception to hearsay rule, under Rule 
ness records, 7 A.L.R.4th 8. 803(11) or Rule 803(12) of Federal Rules of 
Admissibility in evidence of professional di- Evidence, with respect to information con-
rectories, 7 A.L.R.4th 638. tained in records of religious organization, 78 
Admissibility of visual recording of event or A.L.R. Fed. 361. 
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situ-
ations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's state-
ment has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim 
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdo-
ing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing 
the witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of 
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with 
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action 
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the 
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its 
taking so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in 
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the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it 
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by 
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal 
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing 
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the 
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the 
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the 
matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivision 
(a) is comparable to Rule 63(7) (Rule 62(7)1, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Rule 62(7)[(e)], 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), seems to be 
encompassed in Rule 804(a)(5). Subdivision 
(a)(5) is a modification of the federal rule which 
permits judicial discretion to be applied in 
determining unavailability of a witness. 
Subdivision (b)(1) is comparable to Rule 
63(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the 
former rule is broader to the extent that it did 
not limit the admission of the testimony to a 
situation where the party to the action had the 
interest and opportunity to develop the testi-
mony. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 
1980); State v. Brooks, 638 R2d 537 (Utah 
1981). 
Subdivision (b)(2) is comparable to Rule 
63(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the 
former rule was not limited to declarations 
concerning the cause or circumstances of the 
impending death nor did it limit dying declara-
tions in criminal prosecutions to homicide 
cases. The rule has been modified by making it 
applicable to any civil or criminal proceeding, 
subject to the qualification that the judge finds 
the statement to have been made in good faith. 
Subdivision (b)(3) is comparable to Rule 
63(10), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), though 
it does not extend merely to social interests. 
Subdivision (b)(4) is similar to Rule 63(24), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (b)(5) had no counterpart in 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Cross References. — Affidavits admissible 
in hearing on motion, Rule 43(b), U.R.C.P. 
Affidavits, taking and certification of, § 78-
26-5 et seq. 
Contemporaneous entries and writings of de-
cedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8. 
Judgment, entry of, Rule 58A, U.R.C.P. 
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing, 
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12. 
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3; Rule 
44, U.R.C.P. 
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Declarant's unavailability. 
—Burden of proving. 
—Constitutional test. 
— Deceased declarant. 
— Inability to procure attendance. 
Tnahilitv tn tpcHfir 
—Refusal to testify. 
Former testimony. 
Guarantees of trustworthiness. 
Statement against interest. 
Statement of personal or family history. 
Statement under belief of impending death. 
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RECALL. DEODORANT, WHICH I REMEMBER GETTING IN -- I REMEMBER 
THAT STUCK OUT IN MY MIND BECAUSE THE CAR HAD A SMELL TO IT 
THAT -- NOT ONLY FROM THE CIGARETTES, BUT I WAS ALMOST 
SURPRISED TO FIND SOME DEODORANT BECAUSE WHOEVER HAD BEEN 
DRIVING THE CAR, YOU KNOW, DEODORANT WASN'T PART OF HIS DAILY 
ROUTINE. BUT THE THINGS IN THIS LITTLE DUFFEL BAG ACTUALLY 
WERE, YOU KNOW, IT HAD THOSE KIND OF THINGS, DEODORANT, 
MAKEUP, CLOTHES FOLDED. 
Q. LADIES' THINGS IN IT ALSO, HUH? 
A. YES, SIR. 
MR. GILLAND: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
MR. KOTTLER: NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: MAY STEP DOWN. YOU'RE EXCUSED. THANK 
YOU VERY MUCH. WE'LL TAKE A 15-MINUTE RECESS AT THIS POINT. 
AGAIN, I'LL ADVISE JURY NOT TO DECIDE THE CASE UNTIL YOU'VE 
HEARD IT ALL, NOT TO DISCUSS THE CASE AMONGST YOURSELVES OR 
WITH ANYONE ELSE. WE'LL BE IN 15-MINUTE RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON THE COURT TOOK A BRIEF RECESS.) 
THE COURT: OKAY. CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS. 
MR. GILLAND: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD CALL PAUL VAN DYKE. 
PAUL VAN DYKE, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GILLAND: 
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Q. MR. VAN DYKE, WILL YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD AND 
PLEASE SPELL IT? 
A. PAUL DAVID VAN DYKE. P-A-U-L D-A-V-I-D V-A-N D-Y-K-E 
Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CURRENT LIVING CONDITIONS? 
A. I'M HOUSED AT UTAH STATE PRISON. 
Q. WHAT ARE YOU CURRENTLY SERVING TIME FOR? 
A. DOESN'T CONCERN YOU. 
Q. WHAT? 
A. DOESN'T CONCERN YOU. 
Q. CAN YOU SEE THESE TWO PEOPLE SEATED AT THE COUNSEL TABLE 
NEXT TO ME? 
A. I CAN SEE THAT FAR. 
Q. WHO ARE THEY? 
A. I STAND ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. 
Q. YOU DON'T HAVE ANY RIGHT TO THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. WE'RE 
NOT --
MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR, I THINK BEFORE THIS WITNESS 
PROCEEDS TO TESTIFY, IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO ADVISE HIM OF 
HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. HE -- MAYBE HE ALREADY KNOWS OF 
THAT BY INVOKING HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT. 
THE COURT: YEAH, I -- IF WE'RE GONNA BE GETTING 
INTO AREAS THAT WOULD BE AREAS"THAT WOULD BE POSSIBLY HARMFUL 
TO HIM, THEN I CERTAINLY WOULD. IS THAT WHAT YOU INTEND TO 
DO, IS TO GET INTO AREAS WHERE HE MIGHT POSSIBLY BE IN A 
POSITION WHERE HE MAY INCRIMINATE HIMSELF OR --
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MR. GILLAND: YOUR HONOR, I GUESS WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO 
DO IS ASK THE COURT TO RECOGNIZE THIS WITNESS AS A HOSTILE 
WITNESS. 
THE COURT: WELL, LET'S DEAL WITH THEM ONE ISSUE AT 
A TIME FIRST. OKAY? LET ME JUST GIVE THE CAUTIONARY 
INSTRUCTION, AND I THINK MR. VAN DYKE, HE'S ALREADY INDICATED 
AND HE PROBABLY IS AWARE OF IT, BUT OF COURSE YOU UNDERSTAND 
YOUR RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. YOU HAVE A RIGHT 
AGAINST ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS THAT MAY CAUSE -- PUT YOU IN 
HARM AND THAT MAY INCRIMINATE YOU IN ANY WAY. 
THE WITNESS: I UNDERSTAND MIRANDA VERSUS ARIZONA. 
THE COURT: OKAY. YOU UNDERSTAND, THOUGH, THAT YOU 
DON'T HAVE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS IN COURT WHERE THERE MAY BE A 
POSSIBILITY OF A QUESTION MAY ULTIMATELY COME BACK TO HAUNT 
YOU IN SOME WAY AND CAUSE YOU A PROBLEM --
THE WITNESS: I UNDERSTAND --
THE COURT: -- VIOLATION OF THE LAW. 
THE WITNESS: -- CONSTITUTION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND, HOWEVER, IF HE DOES ASK YOU 
A QUESTION THAT DOESN'T GO INTO THAT, THEN WE'D ASK YOU TO 
ANSWER THOSE. OKAY? ALL RIGHT. AND YOU'RE ASKING THAT HE BE 
DECLARED A HOSTILE WITNESS?. I'M NOT -- I DON'T THINK WE'RE AT 
THAT POINT YET. 
MR. GILLAND: OKAY. 
THE COURT: MAYBE WE'LL GET THERE. 
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MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR --
THE COURT: WHAT? 
MR. KOTTLER: --AT THIS POINT, DEFENSE COUNSEL HAS 
ASKED THE WITNESS A QUESTION. HE HAS INVOKED HIS FIFTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT AND THE --IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY AT THIS POINT 
TO ADDRESS THIS QUESTION. 
THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW. DO YOU WANT TO PROCEED 
WITH ANOTHER QUESTION? LET'S JUST -- LET'S JUST LET 
MR. GILLAND HANDLE IT. HE'S GONNA ASK ANOTHER QUESTION OF 
HIM. 
MR. GILLAND: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER ME SITTING IN THE JAIL WITH YOU A COUPLE 
MONTHS AGO? 
A. I INVOKE MY FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. 
Q. YOU REMEMBER ME SITTING WITH YOU IN THE JAIL A COUPLE 
MONTHS AGO? 
A. I INVOKE MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. 
Q. FOR MEMORY? 
A. I STAND BEHIND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. 
THE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU ASK A FEW MORE QUESTIONS. 
IT MAY BE THAT WE'RE NOT GONNA HAVE ANY ANSWERS TODAY? 
MR. GILLAND: MAY,BE WHAT, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: IT MAY BE FROM THE WAY THINGS ARE 
SHAPING UP THAT WE'RE NOT GONNA HAVE ANY ANSWERS TODAY, AND' I 
DON'T KNOW IF THAT'S THE CASE OR NOT AND -- BUT IT'S STARTING 
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TO APPEAR THAT WAY, SO WE COULD FIND OUT QUICKLY AND THEN 
MAYBE WE CAN DEAL --
[BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER SIGNING A STATEMENT, MR. VAN DYKE, ABOUT 
YOUR --
MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR, I'M GONNA OBJECT TO THIS. I 
THINK -- AND I THINK I KNOW WHAT MR. GILLAND IS ASKING FOR. 
AND I DON'T THINK THAT IT WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE AT THIS POINT. 
MAY BE THAT WE'LL NEED TO APPROACH THE BENCH. 
THE COURT: YEAH, I DON'T KNOW --
THE WITNESS: I REMEMBER SIGNING THAT STATEMENT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. GILLAND: WHAT --
THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW, WHAT IS IT --
(WHEREUPON A CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THE BENCH.) 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD, MR. GILLAND. 
£Y MR. GILLAND: 
Q. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN ME BEFORE, MR. VAN DYKE? 
A. YES, I HAVE. 
Q. WHERE DID YOU SEE ME? 
A. I SEEN YOU IN JAIL, SEEN YOU IN COURT, SEEN YOU OTHER 
PLACES. 
Q. WHEN DID YOU SEE ME IN JAIL? 
A. SOME TIME BACK. COULD I MAKE A STATEMENT? 
THE COURT: PROBABLY NOT AT THIS TIME. 
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THE WITNESS: OKAY. GO AHEAD. 
THE COURT: YOU JUST NEED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS. 
[BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. WHEN DID YOU SEE ME IN JAIL? 
A. I SAW YOU IN JAIL. 
Q. NO, FEW MONTHS AGO? 
A. SOMETHING LIKE THAT. 
Q. OKAY. DO YOU REMEMBER OUR CONVERSATION? 
A. YEAH, I REMEMBER IT. 
Q. OKAY. AT THAT TIME, DID YOU CONSIDER THESE PEOPLE YOUR 
FRIENDS, SITTING NEXT TO ME? 
A. AT THAT TIME I DID. 
Q. SOMETHING CHANGE FOR YOU? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU MIGHT BE PUNISHED FOR 
ANSWERING QUESTIONS HERE TODAY? 
A. SEVERELY, YES. 
Q. DID YOU SIGN A STATEMENT OF GUILT ON A --
MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR --
MR. GILLAND: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) WITH ME --
MR. KOTTLER: -- I OBJECT TO THIS STRONGLY, YOUR 
HONOR. HE'S ASKING FOR HEARSAY AT THIS POINT. 
THE COURT: WELL, NO, HE'S NOT ASKING FOR WHAT THE 
STATEMENT SAID. HE JUST SIMPLY ASKED IF HE SIGNED A 
STATEMENT, NOT WHAT HE SAID. 
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MR. KOTTLER: HE DID REFER TO THE CONTENTS OF THE 
STATEMENT. 
THE COURT: YOU KNOW, I THINK WE PROBABLY NEED TO 
DISCUSS THIS IN CHAMBERS BECAUSE I'M -- I'M -- I NEED TO BE 
FILLED IN ON WHAT THE PROBLEM IS HERE. I DON'T KNOW, I'M A 
LITTLE BIT IN THE DARK AS TO WHAT THE CONFUSION IS AND WHAT 
THE PROBLEM IS. IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THAT, I'M GONNA TAKE JUST 
TAKE A BRIEF RECESS. I'LL JUST ASK EVERYBODY TO STAY WHERE 
YOU'RE SEATED AND I'LL TALK TO COUNSEL IN CHAMBERS, AND THEN 
WE'LL GO FROM THERE SHOULDN'T TAKE TOO LONG, AND I JUST ASK 
YOU TO BE PATIENT AND WAIT. THANKS. WE'LL BE IN BRIEF 
RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON THE COURT TOOK A BRIEF RECESS.) 
IN CHAMBERS 
MR. KOTTLER: WE'RE ON THE RECORD NOW? 
THE CLERK: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT WE'RE 
IN CHAMBERS IN THIS CASE AND THAT WE'RE REFERRING TO A 
STATEMENT AND THERE'S BEEN A NUMBER OF OBJECTIONS ABOUT --
THAT RELATE TO HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND I'M 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) ENOUGH INFORMATION TO RULE ON THESE THINGS. 
AND LET'S JUST GET IT CLARIFIED NOW SO THAT WE CAN MOVE THIS 
ALONG. WE'VE GOT A FAIRLY UNCOMFORTABLE SITUATION OUT THERE. 
CLEARLY, THIS WITNESS IS NOT HAPPY TO BE HERE. HE'S FROM THE 
PRISON. HE SEEMS TO BE COOPERATING AT THIS POINT AND I THINK 
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YOU MIGHT AS WELL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT RIGHT NOW BECAUSE I 
DON'T THINK IT'S GONNA LAST A WHOLE LOT LONGER. HE SEEMS TO 
BE WILLING RIGHT NOW, BUT HE'S OBVIOUSLY VERY, VERY UPSET 
ABOUT SOMETHING. 
MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR, WHAT I'M EXPECTING IS 
STATEMENT THAT --
MR. GILLAND: 
MR. KOTTLER: 
THE COURT: 
MR. KOTTLER: 
THE COURT: 
IF I SEE IT. 
MR. KOTTLER: 
THE COURT: 
THINGS? 
MR. KOTTLER: NO, HE HASN'T. AT THIS POINT THE 
STATEMENT ITSELF, THE STATE'S POSITION WOULD BE THE STATEMENT 
ITSELF WOULD BE HEARSAY UNLESS -- ON -- ONLY UNDER ONE 
CONDITION WOULD IT BE ABLE TO COME IN, AND THAT WOULD BE FOR 
IMPEACHMENT. AND IF HE'S INVOKING HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
NOT TO INCRIMINATE HIMSELF, HE'S NOT GIVING A STATEMENT THAT 
COULD BE USED TO IMPEACH HLM. I THINK THAT MR. GILLAND IS 
EXPECTING AT THIS POINT THAT IF HE DOES SPEAK UP, HE'S GONNA 
SAY, NO, HE'S GONNA CHANGE HIS STORY AND SAY, NO, I WASN'T 
THERE, I DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS, AND THEN 
WE'VE TALKED ABOUT IT A LITTLE BIT. 
-- THE STATEMENT THAT MR. GILLAND --
OKAY. WELL, WHAT IS THE STATEMENT? 
-- HAS BEEN REFERRING TO --
JUST SHOW IT TO ME. IT DOESN'T MATTER 
YOUR HONOR, COUPLE OF THINGS --
HAS HE BEEN CHARGED WITH ANY OF THESE 
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MR. GILLAND WOULD IMPEACH HIM WITH THIS SIGNED STATEMENT --
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. KOTTLER: -- THAT WOULD COME IN AT THAT POINT, BUT 
IF HE'S INVOKING HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS --
THE COURT: WHAT ARE YOU INTENDING TO DO BECAUSE HE 
HASN'T GOT --
MR. GILLAND: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) CAUGHT ME A LITTLE OFF 
GUARD BECAUSE I DIDN'T KNOW UNTIL YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD BECOME 
IRRITATED, HE'S --
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. GILLAND: -- A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PERSON. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. GILLAND: AND SO YESTERDAY, JOHN TOLD ME, YOU 
KNOW, THAT HE WAS -- I MEAN I MAY NOT WANNA CALL HIM BECAUSE 
WHEN HE COMES OUT THERE HE'S GONNA BE SCREAMING AND YELLING 
PROFANITIES AND --
THE COURT: IF HE -- IF YOU ASK HIM -- AND FIRST OF 
ALL, YOU HAVE TO ASK HIM THE QUESTIONS IF -- BEFORE YOU CAN 
USE THE STATEMENT TO IMPEACH HIM, AND IF HE DENIES IT, IF HE 
DENIES --
MR. GILLAND: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S RIGHT. HE HAS A RIGHT TO 
DO THAT. HE HAS A RIGHT TO DO THAT. 
MR. KOTTLER: AND IF HE DOES IT, THEN HE CAN'T 
IMPEACHED BASED ON THE PRIOR STATEMENT. 
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THE COURT: I DON'T THINK YOU CAN USE IT TO IMPEACH 
HIS INVOCATION OF RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
MR. GILLAND: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) I'M CAUGHT OFF GUARD, 
BUT THERE WAS --
THE COURT: AND I REALIZE THAT, YOU KNOW, HE 
OBVIOUSLY CHANGED GEARS ON YOU REALLY QUICKLY IN YOUR CASE AND 
OBVIOUSLY HE MAY BE AN IMPORTANT WITNESS IN YOUR DEFENSE, BUT 
I THINK THE PROBLEM YOU HAVE HERE IS HE HAS A RIGHT TO DO IT, 
AND IF I WERE HIM, I'D DO THE SAME THING. 
MR. GILLAND: MY PROBLEM IS FURTHER ENHANCED BECAUSE 
WHEN I FOUND THIS OUT, I IMMEDIATELY STARTED TRYING TO CONTACT 
OFFICER OLROID --
MR. KOTTLER: ODERKIRK. 
MR. GILLAND: ODERKIRK. I LET HIM KNOW I WANTED TO 
SUBPOENA HIM. HE WAS THERE AND PRESENT WHEN PAUL SIGNED THE 
STATEMENT, AND SO I WANTED TO CALL HIM TO TESTIFY AS TO THE 
AUTHENTICITY OF THE SIGNATURE --
MR. KOTTLER: ONCE AGAIN, THAT WOULD BE --
THE COURT: THE KEY IS --
MR. GILLAND: AND I GAVE HIM A SUBPOENA THIS MORNING. 
THE COURT: YEAH, YOU KNOW, HE MAY HAVE SIGNED THAT 
AND YOU -- BUT TO OFFER THIS SOMEHOW FOR THE TRUTH THAT HE IN 
FACT HAD BEEN DRIVING THE CAR AND -- THAT'S HIS STATEMENT AT 
THAT TIME. THERE'S NO WAY TO SAY THAT THAT'S TRUE OR NOT. -IF 
YOU'RE OFFERING IT FOR THE TRUTH AS HEARSAY, AND IT DOESN'T 
* A 
COME IN. IF HE TAKES STAND AND SAYS, I'M NOT ANSWERING YOUR 
QUESTIONS UNDER OATH BECAUSE I DON'T WANT TO PERJURE MYSELF 
AND/OR I DON'T WANT TO INCRIMINATE MYSELF, THEN HE HAS A RIGHT 
TO DO THAT. AND I DON'T THINK YOU CAN BRING IT IN. YOU CAN'T 
BRING IT IN FOR THE TRUTH THAT IN FACT HE DID THAT. NOW, 
IF -- AND IF IT'S SIMPLY TO IMPEACH HIM, SHOWING THAT HE MADE 
A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT AND HE INVOKES HIS RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, HE'S NOT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) THE 
STATEMENT --
MR. GILLAND: AND ACTUALLY, YEAH, THERE MAYBE -- HE --
THAT'S IT, MAYBE IT'S TIME TOO TURN HIM LOOSE AND LET THE --
LET THE DEFENDANTS SAY WHAT HAPPENED --
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK --
MR. GILLAND: -- THAT THE JURY RECONSIDER --
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK THAT'S WHERE YOU'RE AT 
WITH THAT. I MEAN YOU RUN INTO A PROBLEM WITH THE WITNESS AND 
THAT'S (UNINTELLIGIBLE) REALLY UNFORTUNATE. HE FOR WHATEVER 
REASONS DECIDED NOT TO COOPERATE WITH YOUR CASE, AND SOMETIMES 
THAT'S THE WAY IT GOES. YOU KNOW, I DON'T KNOW WHAT MORE YOU 
CAN SAY, BUT I CAN'T -- I CAN'T LET THE STATEMENT COME IN 
THROUGH THE BACK DOOR AND IF HE'S INVOKING HIS RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND IF THAT'S WHAT WE'RE GOING -- BECAUSE I 
DIDN'T KNOW THAT'S WHAT THE STATE WOULD SAY (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
MR. GILLAND: MY INTENTION WAS THAT HE WOULD --HE 
WOULD BE HOSTILE, WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THAT, TRY TO -- I 
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1 WOULD JUST TRY TO GO THROUGH THE QUESTIONS AND LET HIM SAY 
2 WHATEVER HE WANTED TO SAY. 
3 THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
411 MR. GILLAND: AND THEN TURN HIM LOSE, BUT --
5 THE COURT: BUT IF I THINK IF YOU'RE GONNA BE 
6 GETTING INTO HIS -- THE AREA OF WHETHER HE WAS DRIVING THE 
7 STOLEN CAR, IF IT WAS HIS -- THE FACT THEY WERE HIS DRUGS, 
8 THOSE TYPE OF THINGS, YOU KNOW, THAT'S --HE HAS A RIGHT NOT 
9 TO TAKE THAT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) IF HE CHOOSES TO. THE FACT THAT 
10 HE SIGNED THAT PAPER A WHILE AGO NOT UNDER OATH, I THINK -- I 
11 DON'T THINK IT WAIVES ANYTHING AT ALL. HE MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN 
12 TELLING THE TRUTH THEN. AND SO TO OFFER IT FOR THE TRUTH IS 
13 PROBLEMATIC BECAUSE THERE'S NO WAY TO -- ALL IT -- IT'S PRIOR 
14 INCONSISTENT STATEMENT CERTAINLY --
15 MR. GILLAND: BUT ONLY THE --
16 THE COURT: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) BUT ONLY THE STATEMENT 
17 TODAY, IT'S A REAL -- KIND OF A REAL GLITCH (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
18 BUT I THINK THAT'S WHERE WE ARE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) NOW, IT'S UP 
19 TO YOU WHETHER YOU WANNA CONTINUE TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT 
20 ANYTHING ELSE, I DON'T (UNINTELLIGIBLE) I MEAN YOU CAN ASK HIM 
21 QUESTIONS AND HE'LL CONTINUE TO INVOKE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, 
22 AND THAT CERTAINLY --IT DOESN'T PRECLUDE YOU FROM ASKING 
23 OTHER QUESTIONS. HE'S BEEN ADVISED AND YOU CAN DO THAT. 
24 MR. KOTTLER: I WOULD JUST ASK THAT IF THAT'S GONNA 
25 HAPPEN THAT HE NOT ASK HIM IN A LEADING FASHION. FOR EXAMPLE, 
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I MEAN I DON'T WANT --IF THE WITNESS ISN'T GOING TO BE 
WILLING TO ANSWER, I DON'T WANT THE INFORMATION TO GET TO THE 
JURY THROUGH MR. GILLAND'S MOUTH BY SAYING, FOR EXAMPLE, DO 
YOU REMEMBER SIGNING THIS STATEMENT --
THE COURT: OH, NO, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THE 
STATEMENT. I'M TALKING ABOUT DIRECT QUESTIONS REGARDING HIS 
INVOLVEMENT WITH THIS. I THINK HE HAS A RIGHT TO GO THROUGH 
THAT --
MR. KOTTLER: IF HE SAYS --
THE COURT: -- REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HE INVOKES THE 
FIFTH AMENDMENT --
MR. GILLAND: BUT NOT IN A CROSS-EXAMINATION 
FASHION --
MR. KOTTLER: NOT IN A LEADING FASHION --
THE COURT: WELL --
MR. KOTTLER: -- ARE YOU GONNA PERMIT HIM TO SAY, 
ISN'T IT TRUE THAT THE DRUGS IN THE CAR WERE YOURS? ISN'T IT 
TRUE THAT YOU WERE DRIVING THAT STOLEN CAR THAT NIGHT? SEE, 
THAT'S WHAT I'M WORRIED ABOUT, ALL THE INFORMATION IS GONNA 
GET TO THE JURY ANYWAY AND HE'S GONNA BE INVOKING HIS FIFTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT --
THE COURT: WELL --
MR. KOTTLER: -- THE JURY'S GONNA SAY, WELL, 
OBVIOUSLY, HE'S INVOKING HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE --
THE COURT: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) FRANKLY, BECAUSE HE'S A 
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HOSTILE -- HE'S BECOME A HOSTILE WITNESS, AND I THINK HE'S 
ENTITLED TO LEAD HIM TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. I DON'T -- YOU 
KNOW, I DON'T THINK THERE'S, YOU KNOW, A PROBLEM WITH THAT. 
AND HE CAN INVOKE IT OR NOT. HE'S CLEARLY HOSTILE 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) IF YOU WANT, IF HE'S GONNA ASK HIM TO --
MR. GILLAND: YES, AND --
THE COURT: -- AND I THINK HE'S ENTITLED TO THAT. 
HE'S NOT A COOPERATIVE WITNESS. AND HE WAS LED TO BELIEVE HE 
WOULD BE. AND SO I THINK HE'S ENTITLED TO -- HE CAN --HE CAN 
CONTINUE TO -- EITHER TO DENY OR ANSWER THE QUESTION OR INVOKE 
HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT. 
MR. GILLAND: THAT DOESN'T COMPROMISE HIS FIFTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT BECAUSE HE HAS ADMITTED NOTHING THE WAY HE 
SAYS (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: RIGHT, WELL, I MEAN HE MAY -- THE 
PROBLEM (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
MR. GILLAND: YES. 
THE COURT: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) PLEAD FIFTH AMENDMENT. 
MR. KOTTLER: IT'S -- FIFTH AMENDMENT'S NOT A RULE OF 
EVIDENCE, IT'S A RULE -- IT'S A RIGHT OF A DEFENDANT. I THINK 
THAT'S --
THE COURT: IF,YOU"WANT --IF YOU WANNA DO THAT, I'M 
NOT --
MR. GILLAND: IF YOU'RE --
THE COURT: -- TRYING TO TELL YOU WHAT TO DO, BUT 
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I -- I'M JUST ANTICIPATING THAT WE MIGHT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
ANYTHING ELSE? 
MR. GILLAND: OKAY. 
THE COURT: LET'S GO AND GET -- LET'S TRY TO GET 
MOVING ON THIS SO WE CAN GET THROUGH. 
IN OPEN COURT 
MR. GILLAND: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST THAT 
THIS DEFENDANT BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE. 
THE COURT: AND DO YOU WANNA JUST LAY SOME 
FOUNDATION FOR THAT REQUEST AND SO I --
MR. GILLAND: YOUR HONOR, THE WITNESS HAS INDICATED TO 
ME IN THE PAST THAT HE WOULD ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. NOW HE 
DOES NOT WANNA ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. AND I WAS NOT AWARE OF 
THIS UNTIL YESTERDAY MORNING. DONE WHAT I COULD TO TRY TO 
GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. GIVEN THAT, I WILL ALLOW YOU 
TO CROSS-EXAMINATION HIM IN A LEADING FASHION. OR TO EXAMINE 
HIM WITH SOME LEADING QUESTIONS WITHIN --OF COURSE WITHIN 
REASON. 
tBY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. THANK YOU. MR. VAN DYKE, YOU DO REMEMBER WHEN I SAT WITH 
YOU IN JAIL, CORRECT? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. THERE YOU TOLD ME THAT YOU'D DRIVEN YOUR FRIENDS, DON 
BOSTWICK AND KAREN DURHAM, TO THE HOT POTS, CORRECT? 
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THE COURT: I'M GONNA JUST -- JUST LET ME INTERVENE. 
THAT IS NOT THE KIND OF QUESTION WE DISCUSSED BEING ASKED 
HERE. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT YOU WERE SIMPLY GONNA GO 
THROUGH THE FACTUAL SCENARIO AND NOT REFER TO THAT. AND I'M 
GONNA AS YOU TO REPHRASE THE QUESTION AND I'M GOING TO ASK YOU 
TO AVOID REFERRING TO THAT. WE HAVE SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSED 
THIS. AND THAT'S WHAT -- THAT'S WHAT --
MR. GILLAND: I'M AWARE WE DISCUSSED IT. MAY WE 
APPROACH THE BENCH FOR A SECOND? 
THE COURT: TO THE SIDE PLEASE. 
(WHEREUPON A CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THE BENCH.) 
1BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. MR. VAN DYKE, DO YOU REMEMBER THE NIGHT OF AUGUST THE 
26TH, 1996? 
THE WITNESS: YOUR HONOR, THERE'S A DOCUMENT IN MY 
FILE AND IT STATES THAT I WAS GIVEN IMMUNITY OR NO OTHER 
CHARGES WOULD BE PRESSED AGAINST ME FOR COPPING TO A COUPLE OF 
CHARGES, AND I WAS SENT TO PRISON ON, AND ONE OF THEM WAS IN 
YOUR COURT. NOW, UNDER WARD VERSUS UTAH, DOES THAT IMMUNITY 
STAND AT THIS TIME? SO THAT I CAN ANSWER THIS MAN'S QUESTIONS 
WITHOUT BEING PROSECUTED TO THE EXTENT OF THE LAW? 
THE COURT: MR., VAN DYKE, I DON'T SPECIFICALLY 
RECALL WHAT HAPPENED THAT DAY, AND I DON'T FEEL COMFORTABLE AT 
ALL MAKING THAT ASSURANCE TO YOU. AND I WOULD - - M Y 
SUGGESTION TO YOU WOULD BE SIMPLY TO ACT IN YOUR BEST 
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INTERESTS, YOU KNOW, NOT NECESSARILY RELYING ON SOMETHING LIKE 
THAT. 
THE WITNESS: I HAVEN'T -- I'M BEING REFUSED 
PROTECTION OF THE COURTS AND I OF COURSE HAVE NO LEGAL COUNSEL 
HERE TO REPRESENT ME ON THIS MATTER, SO THEREFORE, I HAVE TO 
PLEAD FIFTH AMENDMENT ON EVERYTHING. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND I -- AND I THINK THAT'S 
UNDERSTOOD AND I'M JUST NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSURE YOU ABOUT 
THAT QUESTION, SO -- GIVE YOU AN ANSWER TO IT, AND I DON'T 
WANT YOU TO BE MISLED ABOUT IT, SO I'M JUST -- I CAN'T ANSWER 
IT. 
[BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. YOU CAN ANSWER, HOWEVER, YOU WOULD LIKE, MR. VAN DYKE. 
A. YES, I REMEMBER THAT NIGHT. BUT I'M NOT --
Q. CAN YOU REMEMBER ANYTHING PARTICULAR ABOUT IT? WHY DOES 
IT STAND OUT TO YOU? 
A. BECAUSE SOME PEOPLE THAT I THOUGHT WERE FRIENDS WERE 
ARRESTED THAT NIGHT. 
Q. WERE YOU WITH THOSE FRIENDS THAT NIGHT? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. DID YOU -- WERE YOU WITH THEM AT THEIR HOME THAT NIGHT? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. DID YOU GO ANYWHERE IN A VEHICLE THAT NIGHT? 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. WERE THE THREE OF YOU IN THE VEHICLE THAT YOU WENT IN? 
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A. YES. 
Q. DO YOU RECALL WHAT KIND OF VEHICLE THAT WAS? 
A. I STAND ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT THERE. 
Q. OKAY. WAS -- WERE YOU THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE? 
A. I STAND ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. 
MR. GILLAND: THINK, MR. VAN DYKE, THAT'S ALL THE 
QUESTIONS I HAVE FOR YOU AT THIS TIME. 
THE COURT: DOES THE STATE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? 
MR. KOTTLER: I DON'T THINK I DO. 
THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. YOU'RE EXCUSED. AND 
YOU MAY CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS, MR. GILLAND. 
MR. GILLAND: YES, YOUR HONOR --
MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR, BEFORE WE GO ON, THE 
REFERENCE THAT MR. GILLAND MADE OF (UNINTELLIGIBLE) OR 
STATEMENT THAT WAS WRITTEN BY THE PRIOR WITNESS, I WOULD ASK 
AT THIS TIME THAT THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED THAT THAT BE 
DISREGARDED AND THAT THAT BE STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD. 
THE COURT: I'LL STRIKE THE QUESTION REGARDING THE 
STATEMENT THAT WAS REFERRED TO EARLIER THAT I SUSTAINED THE 
OBJECTION ON. 
MR. KOTTLER: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: GO,AHEAD, CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS PLEASE. 
MR. GILLAND: DEFENSE CALLS KAREN DURHAM. 
THE COURT: AND YOU'LL GO THROUGH HER RIGHT NOT TO 
TESTIFY PLEASE, YOU'LL EXPLAIN TO HER HER RIGHT NOT TO 
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TESTIFY, GET HER PERMISSION TO PROCEED? 
MR. GILLAND: SURE. 
KAREN DURHAM, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
fcY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. KAREN, WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD? 
A. KAREN MAY DURHAM. 
Q. AND WOULD YOU SPELL IT PLEASE? 
A. K-A-R-E-N M-A-Y D-U-R-H-A-M. 
Q. OKAY. MRS. DURHAM, YOU'VE CHOSEN TO TAKE THE WITNESS 
STAND AT THIS TIME. ARE YOU AWARE OF YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT NOT TO TAKE THE TIME WITNESS STAND? 
A. YES. 
Q. ARE YOU AWARE THAT THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO 
PROVE THEIR CASE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT WHETHER YOU TAKE 
THE WITNESS STAND OR NOT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND IF YOU TAKE THE WITNESS STAND, THAT YOU COULD BE 
CALLED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, AND IF THOSE QUESTIONS ARE 
ANSWERED IN AN INCRIMINATING FASHION, THEY COULD INCRIMINATE 
YOU? 
A. YES. 
Q. SO -- SO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT THAT 
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